Association for Information Systems

AIS Electronic Library (AISeL)
ICIS 1989 Proceedings

International Conference on Information Systems
(ICIS)

1989

INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND
ECONOMIC REORGANIZATION
Eric K. Clemons
University of Pennsylvania

Michael C. Row
University of Pennsylvania

Follow this and additional works at: http://aisel.aisnet.org/icis1989
Recommended Citation
Clemons, Eric K. and Row, Michael C., "INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND ECONOMIC REORGANIZATION" (1989).
ICIS 1989 Proceedings. 34.
http://aisel.aisnet.org/icis1989/34

This material is brought to you by the International Conference on Information Systems (ICIS) at AIS Electronic Library (AISeL). It has been accepted
for inclusion in ICIS 1989 Proceedings by an authorized administrator of AIS Electronic Library (AISeL). For more information, please contact
elibrary@aisnet.org.

INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND
ECONOMIC REORGANIZATION
Eric K. Clemons
Michael C. Row
The Wharton School

University of Pennsylvania

ABSTRACT
Information Technology (IT) can support or even cause changes in the structure of industries and the
relationships between firms. Yet, at present, we lack the vocabulary and theory to explain or predict
these changes. Drawing on recent work in the resource-based theory of the firm, we propose that
shifts in resource values are central to economic restructuring. We show how IT can operate to shift
resource values through the basic economic drivers of network externalities and economies of scale,
scope, and specialization. We use this theory to investigate the situations that will lead to each of the

basic structural responses:

changes in market consolidation, in diversification, and in vertical

integration. We also can make some specific statements about what forms can be employed in the
structural responses: ownership, outsourcing, or cooperation.
1.

INTRODUCTION

2.

It has been observed that IT can cause or support changes

ECONOMIC RESTRUCTURING: ANTECEDENTS

The issues of economic oiganization and stmcture have
been concerns of several areas of study. As a result, there

in the structure of industries and the relationships between
players. It has even been suggested that these structural

has been some variety in definitions, assumptions and

changes may be more important to competitive position

theory.

and survival than being the innovator, since strategic

theories of economic structure in economics and strategic

In this section, we examine the evolution of

applications of IT are often easily duplicated (Clemons and

management. We seek to give a sense for the relationships

Row 1987; Vitale 1986).

between these major areas of academic study and for the

evolution of concepts and theories, as a context for the
resource-based view presented in the next section. We
draw on the concepts of each theory as appropriate. We
do not review the literature's empirical support of these

Although IT's role in economic change is recognized, we
lack even good vocabulary to discuss such changes in
economic structure, much less any theory for explaining or
predicting them. The problem is complicated by the fact
that structural changes in a particular market don't happen

theories.

in a vacuum, but interact with changes in other markets.

2.1 Traditional Industrial Organization View

Many structural changes involve the inter-relationships of

a single firm's operations in several markets.

Economic structure has a central role in traditional

This paper examines economic reorganization and the role

This role is probably best characterized by the stmcmre-

IT plays in it. Economic change is viewed in terms of
changes in the allocation and integration of strategic
resources. This resource-based approach builds on our

conduct-pe,fonnance paradigm.

industrial organization (IO) economics (c.g., Scherer 1980).
In this model, market

structure provides the context for firm behavior, and both

together determine performance:

generally includes (Scherer 1980, p. 4):

earlier work (Clemons and Row 1987). In that paper, we
suggested that change in competitive position comes from

leveraging an advantage or mitigating a disadvantage in

.

critical resources and showed how IT could be used to

•

Product differentiation

accomplish this by exploiting structural differences among

•

Barriers to entry

firms.

•

Vertical integration

•

Diversification

Market structure

The number and distribution ofbuyers and sellers

Here we show how IT's effect on resource values can

The theory in this field grows out of traditional microeconomics. It is posited that firm profits arise from
monopoly power, when there is a monopoly seller or a few
sellers that can collude to restrict output below the

operate to change the structure of economic activity. The
proposed framework is used to make predictions about

what types of structural changes would be expected in
specific situations.
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competitive level. Where there is an oligopoly, monopoly

However, the traditional IO field has contributed a

power is viewed as a shared industry resource. Market
structure thus plays the critical role of constraining the size
of this shared resource or the range of potential profits

vocabulary, extensive theory, and a substantial body of
empirical results that can help in understanding the impact

available to competitors through collusion.

extensively in the IT literature. IO, as popularized by
Porter (1980), has been used frequently (e.g., McFarlan

There are several problems with this approach for our
purposes. In traditional IO, the unit of analysis is a market
or industry, variously defined in terms of substitution of
demand, production, or inputs. But in investigating the
impact of IT on economic structure, we are often con-

1984; Parsons 1983). Bat(os and Treacy (1986) also view
more formal IO analysis, for example game theory, as a
promising direction for future work. Unfortunately, the
traditional IO approach has not yet yielded a conceptual

cerned with changes in industry boundaries and relationships between markets.2 For example, Merrill Lynch's
CMA financial product combined banking functions, check,
and debit card access to funds with brokerage functions,

investment reporting, and margin accounts (including
sweeps of available funds into money market funds). This

of IT on economic structure. This field has been drawn on

theory of strategic applications of IT with significant
explanatory or predictive capability, largely, we feel,
because of the limitations of traditional IO discussed
previously in this section.
2.2 The New Institutional Economics View

product supported a breakdown in the boundary between
the banking industry and the securities industry (Clemons
and Row 1988a). 10 gives us few tools and concepts to
deal with these structural relationships between markets.

Several conceptual directions have been taken to cope with
the problems presented by traditional IO. These include
Williamson's (1975) transaction cost theoty, the evolutionary theoty of Nelson and Winter (1982) and what we

Traditional IO also is weak in dealing with firm differences. The microeconomic basis of 10 represents firms as

call the resource-based theog: These theoretical directions that form the basis for our work.

production functions and often assumes homogeneous
firms. In most industries, firms differ in very fundamental
ways. A key difference among firms is often in what

Williamson's transaction cost theory attempted to address
some shortcomings in traditional IO. He posited that the

organization of economic activity was based on balancing

markets they compete and what activities they perform in
those markets. Another critical difference is the organizational structure of firms. We are concerned with how IT

production economies, such as scale, against the cost of
transacting. With the transaction as the unit of analysis,
Williamson united the problems of market structure and
organizational structure, by viewing markets and firms as
alternative ways of organizing economic activity. Firms
were viewed as more efficient than markets in situations of
recurring transactions under high uncertainty with significant sunk costs in managing the transaction.

affects relationships between business units in a firm and
how these relationships influence competition in each
market (Clemons and Row 1987). We view these relationships as an important part of economic structure.
There are some attempts to incorporate observed firm
differences in both strategy and profitability into traditional
IO through a theory of strategic groups (e.g., Caves 1977;

The transaction cost approach appears to be very useful in

Porter 1979) or groups of firms following similar strategies.
This work on the structure within an industry retains the
idea of monopoly power as a shared resource, but makes
the relevant unit of analysis a strategic group. In this
theory, barriers to entry may vary by strategic group,
creating differences in the profitability of the groups.
Further, each group's profitability is influenced by mobility bam'ers, which protect the group from rivalry with
other groups. However, this approach still lacks the

the high level features of economic structure. Decision
makers characterized by bounded rationality and opportunism operate over time in an uncertain environment.
These micro-level assumptions lead to the breakdown of

conceptual tools to discuss the structure of relationships

markets in certain technological and environmental

investigating the relationship between IT and economic

structure. First, its definition of structure is sufficiently
broad to deal with relationships between markets and
between business units in a firm (organizational structure).
Second, it provides a link between micro level behavior and

between strategic groups and between business units in a

situations, determining the boundaries and structure of

firms and markets. Moreover, the micro level theory
appears well suited to information systems, given the
importance of bounded rationality, information, and

firm.

A final problem with the traditional IO view of economic
structure is that its theoretical roots are based in assumplions that are unhelpful in analyzing the structural impact
of IT: In particular, equilibrium of optimizing behavior

uncertainty.
But transaction cost theory does not have a well defined
theory of profitabilitys or of differences among firms, and
therefore of changes in economic structure. Differences
in firm profitability are assumed to arise from differences

under perfect information seems more than a little
restrictive. Understanding the role of IT depends on
explicit attention to bounded rationality and imperfect
information.

in efficiency in setting firm boundaries, organizational

342

structure, and employment relationships. This does not
give a clear view of what guides reaction when the underlying economics change, particularly when firms differ in

addresses many of the conceptual problems in alternative

strategy and structure. Moreover, transaction cost theory

previous section. More importantly, we view this approach

does not provide the tools for analyzing interrelationships
among a firm's transactions. For example, a fixed transaction infrastructure that is common to several types of

transactions can drastically change the transaction costs for
any individual interaction. Similarly, converting data to
machine readable form at one point in a value chain
decreases the transaction costs in subsequent transactions.

The issue of structural change was addressed extensively
by Nelson and Winter (1982). In their evolutionary theory,
they proposed that firms be viewed as a collection of
routines. Reaction to a change in environment will depend
heavily on the nature of a firm's learned routines (i.e.,
history). Their conceptual approach is intuitively appealing
for the study of IT. Again, information and information
processing limitations play a central role. IT, in fact, can

be viewed as a medium for storage of an organization's
routines. While we do not adopt their modeling approach,

their philosophy of the change process underlies the
resource-based work presented later.
The relevance of transaction cost theory to the issues of IT

has been recognized within the IT field (Bakos and Treacy
1986). Malone, Yates and Benjamin (1987) presented the
most complete treatment to date of the transaction cost

view of the relationship between IT and economic organization. They suggest that IT influences economic organi-

zation by reducing transaction costs and reducing the
specificity of assets. As a result, IT would tend to favor
market-mediated transactions. They identified two forms

of electronic mediation: electronic markets and electronic
hierarchies. However, relying solely on transaction cost
theory, it was not possible to make any statements about
the competitive effects of such changes.

Clemons and Kimbrough (1986) focus more on the
competitive effect of reducing transaction costs.

They

argued that "competitive advantage" could result when the

transaction costs in dealing with some competitors were
reduced more than for others. The situations and types of
applications that would lead to this result were not fully
developed.

transaction cost economics, which we identified in the

as being extremely useful in analyzing IT's impact on
economic structure.
Penrose (1959) first proposed that firms be viewed as

collections of resources. Her interest was primarily in

explaining the growth of firms, which was, in her view,
driven by a desire to utilize slack resources. Rubin (1973)
further clarified and formalized the concept of a resource

as a "fixed input which enables a firm to perform a
particular task" (p. 937). He modeled firm expansion as
being driven by jinn-specifc resources, those resources
that were difficult to transfer via the market mechanism.

The role of resources in firm growth and diversification has
been further developed by Teece (1980, 1982) and Rumelt
(1982). Wernerfelt (1984) related the resource perspective

to several issues in IO.
resource ham'eis,

He showed that focusing on

the resources that underlie the entry

barriers of traditional IO, was very useful in planning
diversification strategies. The importance of strategic
factor markets was developed in detail by Barney (1986),
who showed that the timing of resource acquisition on the

strategic factor markets greatly influences the cost of
implementing various strategies for different firms. This
work is very useful in understanding the emergence and

evolution of firm differences.
Abernathy and Clark (1985) as well as Teece (1986,1987)
have shown how innovation can influence the value of a
firm's resources and how these resources can influence
who retains the economic benefits of the innovation. The
impacts of an innovation will generally differ according to
the resource positions of the various participants.

In the rest of this section, we explicate the relationship
between resources and economic structure and describe
how resources influence the evolution of structure over
time. We then introduce the role of IT in this process.
3.1 Resources and Structure
In the resource-based approach, the concern is with the
allocation of resources to activities. Firms are viewed as
resource bundles under common managerial control. A

The resource-based theory, presented in the next section,
appears, at least conceptually, to resolve the problems of
transaction cost theory, while explicitly taking into account

firm's profitability is closely linked to the terms under

the evolution of economic structure. Moreover, this
approach has the capability of making predictive statements
and discriminating among possible outcomes.
3.

theories, particularly industrial organization economics and

which it can access these resources in the strategic factor
markets. Firms and markets evolve to maximize profits,

given the distribution of resources, which will usually differ
due to history and chance (Barney 1986).

IT AND ECONOMIC RESTRUCTURING:
A RESOURCE-BASED VIEW

Within this context, economic st,ucture can be viewed as
the distribution of resources to activities and the interactions among these activities. As with the transaction cost
approach, we are concerned with the question of how the

In this section we describe the resource-based view of
economic organization. We maintain that this approach
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interactions are managed. The form of organization for
the interaction is subject to the tradeoff between production economies and transaction costs.

Firms with an initial comparative advantage in the resource
will realize the increased value as superior profitability
(i.e., return on investment). Firms that must acquire the

There are two sets of interactions that are of importance.
The first are what we call vemca/ interactions: the flow

resource must do so at a price that reflects the economic
change; the increase in economic value is capitalized. That
means that the costs and benefits of the same strategic

of goods and services along a single value chain.

adjustment may be radically different for different players

In

vertical interactions, the output of one activity is an input
to the other activity. There are also horizontal interac-

in the same industry.

tions: the coordination of similar or complementary
resources among multiple markets or industries. Both of
these types of interactions can be either intra-organi-

Differences in profitability lead to changes in industry
structure as firms try to exploit a resource advantage or

zational or inter-organizational.

minimize the effects of a resource disadvantage. There is
rarely only one solution.

Changes in economic structure thus amount to changes in
the allocation of resources to activities or changes in the

33 Role of IT in Restructuring

interactions between activities. The mechanism of this
IT enters this picture in two ways. First, innovations in IT
or innovative applications of IT can be a source of changes

change process is discussed next.

in resource values.

3.2. Evolution of Economic Structure

This can be the case where the

application is itself a key strategic resource or where IT
directly influences the economics of production or transaction activities. For example, in drug distribution IT has
become a significant resource in itself as well as enabling
economies from the rationalization of purchasing and
distribution (Clemons and Row 1988b).

The evolutionary view of industry restructuring that we
propose treats resources as fundamental drivers of the
structural change process. Industry restructuring is the
result of changes in the value of these resources.

Second, IT can be used as a mechanism for implementing
strategies for adjusting to changing values of other, non-

The restructuring process begins with some shift. This may

be external to the firm or be driven by innovation within
the firm. The shift may be radical or may result from

IT resources. For example, Merrill Lynch's CMA account

gradual evolution of the firm's environment, including
changes to product supply and demand conditions, technol-

was primarily an effort to take advantage of economic and
regulatory changes that enabled Merrill to offer bankinglike services, while still being protected from retaliation by

ogy, and institutional support.

banks; this discontinuity increased the value of Merrill's
distribution network, money market funds, and other

The shift alters the economic value of some resource. For
example, an innovation that doubles the yield of a machine
changes the productive value of that machine. But a
change in the productive value of a resource doesn't

resources by opening up a new source of demand (Clemons and Row 1988a).

necessarily translate into a change in economic value,
which also depends on the supply and demand conditions
for that resource on the strategic factor market.

Similarly, the use of systems for quality improvement in the
automobile industry was driven by an increase in the value
of quality, itself driven by the quality of Japanese imports,
and a sharp increase in the cost of consumer credit (e.g.,

Eisenstein 1988).

If the resource is available in competitive supply, all
producers will be able to acquire the resource at the same

cost, using the increased productivity to expand output,
driving down the product price, with the result that much
of the economic benefit of the increased productive value
of the resource will be competed away to customers.

4.

TYPES OF RESTRUCTURING

Economic restructuring can be viewed as changes in the
allocation and integration of resources. We can therefore
begin to classify changes in economic structure by looking
at the basic ways firms can alter or redeploy their resource

But many strategic resources are not available in competitive supply, due to imperfections in the strategic factor
markets. Some resources are unique, or essentially

bundles.

nonduplicable, such as market shares in a mature industry.
Some resources are so highly specialized that the transac-

•

tion costs of acquiring them are prohibitive:
Thus, changes in the economic value of key resources will

not affect all firms equally, but will depend on the initial
distribution of the resources. Firms often differ in resource endowments for historical reasons (Barney 1986).

•

Size: Firms can expand or contract within a particular
market, relative to the total market size.

Diversification: Firms can expand into, or withdraw
from, different markets and industries.
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•

exiting. Similarly, if a firm gets wider, for example, by

Vertical Integration: Firms can expand into, or
withdraw from, activities that are vertically related
within a single value chain.

offering a service to several industries, then either existing

companies offering that service are getting smaller, or
existing companies that consume that service and had

Each of these can be generalized in terms of changes in
integration between resources. An increase in firm size
implies an increase in the integration of resources horizontally within the market, i.e; more resources are under the
common control of a single firm:' An increase in diversification means an increase in the integration of resources
horizontally between markets. An increase in vertical

performed it internally are now getting narrower.

integration implies, of course, increased integration of

4.1 Horizontal Integration of Resources

In the following sections we will discuss the major types of
restructuring and the primary economic drivers of these
types in the context of IT.

resources vertically along a single value chain. Corresponding statements can be made for decreasing integra-

within a Market

tion. It is important to keep in mind that we are dealing
with relative terms, rather than absolute measures of
structure.

Changes in the horizontal integration of resources within
a market is perhaps the most straightforward of the basic
forms of restructuring. The primary economic driver of

concentration within a market is the desire for scale
By viewing the underlying concept as integration, rather

economies. Scale economies increase when the productivity of a fixed factor of production is increased. In
general, IT contributes to increasing scale economies both

than simply firm boundaries, we can recognize that restructuring may be virtlial, in that many of the economic effects

of restructuring can be realized without changes in ownership. For example, McKesson's Economist can be viewed
as virtual forward integration: the strategic network of
McKesson and its customers achieve many of the benefits

as a resource itself and as a mechanism for coordinating

of the large chains, but without ownership (Clemons and
Row 1988b).

As a strategic resource, IT exhibits large inherent scale

In fact, the fonn of integration can be by ownership,

like information, is a public good, in that use does not

outsourcing, or cooperation. The first two are the traditional hierarchies and markets of transaction cost economics fame (Williamson 1975). Cooperation is meant to
include what Malone, Yates and Benjamin (1987) call

reduce the value of the resource. The marginal software

"electronic hierarchy" and what has been called "strategic

data center also approaches zero.

network" (Thorelli 1986). These forms are slightly different for horizontal, as opposed to vertical, interactions.

Due to these scale economies, there should be pressure for

other resources. IT is, therefore, a pressure for increasing

concentration in most markets.

economies in both development and operation. This may
seem obvious, but it is of critical importance. Software,
development cost of installing a branch automation system
in an additional branch is close to zero. Similarly, the
marginal cost of processing an additional transaction in a

increased concentration of the IT resource. The amount
of pressure should be related to the importance of IT to
the business and its cost relative to other costs. There are

The form of resource integration (ownership, outsourcing,

or cooperation) depends in part on the initial resource
positions. Small players that are severely disadvantaged in
certain key resources may be acquired or forced into
bankruptcy; alternatively, they may be forced into virtual
consolidation in the form of consortia or reliance upon
vendors. For example, the members of the NYCE ATM

three furms this concentration could take:

ownership

consolidation, outsourcing, and cooperative supply. The

modes chosen depend on the potential economies of
integration, the initial resource positions, and transaction
costs in transferring the services of the resource. All of
these modes can exist at once in any given industry.

network formed a joint venture to generate the scale and
geographic coverage necessary to compete with Citibank.

We would expect that resource integration through

Likewise small brokerages and banks find it advantageous
to purchase back office processing from larger banks and
other third parties, since internal development and opera-

tion would be prohibitively expensive, given their lack of
scale. Clearly, multiple modes of integration can co-exist
within an industry.

ownership consolidation would increase with the importance of the IT applications to the core business, with the
potential of IT economies of scale, and with the initial
resource position (e.g., market share or other measure of
relative scale). In other words, the larger the company

It is important to realize that any change in a firm's

resource, the more we would expect to see an aggressive

(relative to competitors) and the more critical the IT
structure is usually accompanied by related changes in
other firms. Economic restructuring must be viewed in
this holistic way. For example, if a firm increases in size
relative to the market (i.e., increases its market share),
some other firms are contracting relative to the market, or

ownership consolidation strategy. The observed ownership
consolidation occurring in IT intensive industries, such as
banking, securities and other financial services, is consistent
with this statement. This was particularly acute in securities firms following the 1975 deregulation of commission
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rates. Small competitors, without the resources to develop
and operate the applications efficiently, are under pressure

Department.

Amadeus and Galileo, in Europe, and

to either be acquired or merge (Clemons and Row 1988b).

Abacus and Fantasia, in Asia, are all joint ventures
between multiple airlines. Similarly, in most major

Where the transaction costs of accessing the resources are

markets, ATMs have consolidated into one or two cooperative multiple-owner networks. A seeming exception to

low relative to the savings from scale economies in the
resource, and the risks of dependence are low also, other

this is the MAC network in Philadelphia, a monopoly
network that is wholly owned by Philadelphia National
Bank. The single owner form of MAC can largely be
explained by timing. MAC was an early shared ATM
network, initiated years before NYCE, and before many of

options are available. Smaller competitors may outsoutre,

that is, acquire the services of the resources from third
parties. These third party vendors may be larger players
from within the industry or from industries with significant

its participants realized the strategic importance of ATM
service to their retail operations. They were therefore
willing to accept the risks associated with outsourcing from
a competitor (Clemons 1989). Also, closer examination
reveals that there is now a governing board made up of

overlap in the key resources (see the discussion on diversi-

fication below). Again, the financial services industry is a
good example. Many large players, such as Merrill Lynch
and PNC Financial, provide IT support to smaller players
in their industry.

MAC's member banks. Additionally, the network resources are still owned and operated by the member banks,
constituting a viable threat of defection and thus con-

Smaller competitors may also form consonia or other
cooperative ventures to compensate for a resource disadvantage.
Cooperative ventures are most frequently

straining MAC's ability to exploit its monopoly position.

So far we have focused on IT as a resource subject to scale
economies, but IT can also exploit scale economies in
other strategic resources. Potential scale economies may

observed when there are substantial benefits to resource
concentration, but no player has the resources required

by themselves, and when there are factors that argue
against outsourcing. This occurs when there are substan-

the firm's dependence at some point in the future (see, for

exist in some key resources, but not be exploited due to
transaction costs in transferring the services of the resources. IT may reduce these transaction costs, enabling

example, Klein, Crawford and Alchian 1978). Cooperative
ventures are most common as a defense against dominant
players. New York's NYCE ATM network is an example.

potential scale economies to become realized. For
example, Hewlett Packard, the electronics giant, utilizes a
very decentralized structure. Operating units are very

NYCE was formed largely as a response to the dominant

focused and autonomous. However, there is a significant

position Citibank had in ATMs.

overlap in components and other inputs among these
diverse businesses. HP has implemented a purchasing
system that allows central purchasing of these common
components, while not compromising the autonomy and
flexibility of the operating units. The system also tracks
component quality across divisions to aid in supplier

tial risks that the vendor will be in a position to exploit

Another very strong pressure for concentration of IT
resources can come from netwo/* grternalities. Network
externalities exist when the value of a system is dependent
on the number of participants in the system. Systems that

handle interactions between customers and suppliers may
exhibit such economies, since the value of the system to the
customer may depend on the range of products or suppliers participating. The key example here is the airline
reservations systems. The network externalities are so
significant that all systems feel they must list all major
airlines, even competitors. Bank ATM networks also

negotiations and integrates component demand schedules

exhibit significant network externalities, since the value of
the network to users increases with the number of banks
participating.

Frequently the potential scale advantages that can be
exploited through IT stem from load leveling of fixed

to improve coordination with supplier's production schedules. This system exploits economies of scale, scope and
specialization in purchasing as well as more fully utilizing
HIP's tremendous purchasing power.11

resources and increased predictability afforded by scale.
Otis Elevator Company operated its elevator maintenance

activities decentralized by geographical region. By using
Where network externalities and scale economies are
significant, it is unlikely that the industry will support many

IT to centralize customer service via their Otistine system,
Otis Elevator was able to greatly improve the productivity

and ATMs are again excellent examples. One of the two
dominant airline reservations systems in the US (Covia,

and utilization of customer service personnel. Moreover,
the system enabled better planning and allocation of
maintenance resources and information usefulin marketing
and product planning. The result was lower costs and
greatly enhanced customer service (Stoddard 1987).
Similarly, McKesson used the data captured by their

formerly United Apollo) is now co-owned by multiple

Economist system to rationalize warehouse and delivery

airlines. Attempts by the second system to open ownership
up to other airlines were recently derailed by the Justice

operations with dramatic results (Clemons and Row
1988b).

competing systems. At the same time, such a monopoly or

oligopoly situation is extremely threatening to most players
in the industry. In these situations cooperative ventures
appear to be a stable solution. Airline reservations systems
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Again, these economies will create pressure for resource
consolidation. In these cases, alternatives to ownership
consolidation are more difficult. This is primarily due to

higher transaction costs in transferring the services of nonIT resources. However, examples do exist. Abbot Laboratorics and 3M have formed an alliance for joint ordering
and distribution of their products (Muller 1988). This
cooperative venture shares not only the systems, but
physical distribution resources.

Will IT ever lead to fragmentation of a market? We argue
that it would be rare for IT to lead to fragmentation,
although IT may allow a fragmented market to remain so.

From time to time the argument is made that a new
technology will lead to a populist "fragmentation" -- see, for

example, early literature on CATV and cellular radio.
Often, other reasons and other factors, such as economies

multiple markets, reducing average units costs. However,
diversification can also create scope economies where the
value of the integration is greater than the parts indepen-

dently.

The resource being leveraged between markets may be IT

itself.

In this case, the benefits may come from scale
economies in the IT. McKesson has leveraged its drug

distribution systems and expertise in other industries, such
as office supplies distribution. Here, scale economies in IT

development are obtained through technology transfer
between markets or industries. It is also possible to realize
scale economies in IT operations by integrating IT
resources between markets. McKesson is attempting this
with its efforts to create super-distribution centers, com-

bining operations for multiple distribution businesses
(Clemons and Row 1988b).

of scale in marketing, lead to the opposite result.
Note that by outsourcing or forming cooperative ventures,

This integration between markets can take on any of the
forms that integration within a market can: ownership

consolidation, outsourcing, or cooperative agreements.

two related structural changes are occurring. First, the
resource is becoming more concentrated in the market.
Second, the firms outsourcing have shortened their value

Again, IT can reduce the transaction costs sufficiently to

chains, i.e., reduced the activities in the value chain which
they perform. In other words, a scale-intensive resource

resources to be realized. The discussion in the previous
section is also relevant here.

can consolidate
other activities.
industry. ATM
kets,12 but the

The cooperative agreements in the airline industry, such as

without affecting the fragmentation of
An example is ATMs in the banking
services have consolidated in most marnetworks have not exploited this con-

centration to earn extraordinary profits. Access to these

services is affordable even to most small banks. As a
result, ATMs do not create significant pressure for bank
consolidation.13

This phenomenon of outsourcing may be more common
where the resource is IT, due to the low transaction costs
involved in IT services. When data are already in machine
readable form, it is easy to outsource. In fact, we have
seen examples where firms may outsource discontinuous

allow potential economies of scale in other, non-IT

the recent agreements between SAS and Texas Air (Ott
1988) or British Air and United (Banks 1988), are good
examples of cooperative arrangements between markets.
While these airlines do not compete directly, 14 they can

share airport facilities and marketing efforts, reducing
costs. Moreover, shared facilities and shared flight codes
allow each airline to funnel customers to the other in a
reciprocal fashion: SAS is a feeder for Continental and
vice versa. This type of arrangement is becoming increasingly popular in the industry. IT plays a critical role
in implementing this integration.

Provident National Bank in Philadelphia performs back

portions of a single value chain. Maybe the best documented example of this is in guaranteeing student loans,
where some steps are performed by the originator, and

office processing for small brokerage firms. Similarly,
State Street Bank in Boston has a major position in
securities custodial services. Such outsourcing between
markets appears very common in financial services due to
the high overlap in the resources required in the different
markets. Even firms outside the industry, such as ADP
and McGraw-Hill, perform services for small players in
financial services. We expect outsourcing and cooperation
between markets actually to be more common than within
market, since there is less likely to be anti-trust limitations
or competitive concerns.

some performed by the guarantor; the outsourced steps are

not, in general, contiguous steps in the loan servicing
process (Kimbrough 1989). When the resources being
integrated are tangible, such as warehouses and trucks, it
may be more difficult to outsource. We will return to the
issue of such "outsourcing" when we talk of vertical
disintegration.

4.2 Horizontal Integration or Resources
between Markets

In the above discussion, similar resources are being
integrated between markets and industries. These economies are scale economies made possible by the firm's
scope. IT can support such economies either by increasing
the scale benefits of the resource or by decreasing the
transaction cost of coordinating resource utilization
between markets.

The horizontal integration of resources is not limited to a
single market. Where similar resources are employed in
several markets or industries, it may be possible to utilize
IT to integrate these resources, realizing considerable
economic benefits. These economic benefits may be
creating scale advantages in resources that are similar in
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In some cases, integrating dissimilar resources between

markets can provide an alternative form of economies of
scope, where the integration results in a product or service

whose value is greater than the combined value of the
constituent parts separately. Merrill Lynch's CMA is a
classic example of this, where banking and brokerage
services were integrated in a single delivery system (Clemons and Row 1988a). The airline CRS also appears to

supporting this result.

have a "super-additive" value function with the addition of

hotel and rental car reservations.

disintegration is likely to be a stable cooperative contractual relationship (electronic hierarchy), rather than a
competitive one (electronic market). We can think of no
examples of IT leading to fully competitive disintegration
for access to resources. There is a reasonable argument

The value of this

combination is more than just combining reservations fur
these different functions: it is a platform for integrated
trip management services. Exploiting this source of scope

Contractual sourcing will be

preferred over competitive sourcing when the economies
of an assured relationship outweigh the improved price
(less search costs) that could be obtained from competitive
search. Where the product in question is access to a fixed
resource, it appears rare that competitive sourcing will be

preferred. imagine a bank bidding for an ATM network
daily,15 or deciding who will perform back office processing

on a transaction by transaction basis. For resource access,
the sophistication of the interface, the need for record
keeping, the expense of training, and the value of a
relationship over time argue for long term contractual
relationships, even for commodity resources.

economies was central to the ill-fated Allegis strategy,
leading to Ferris's ouster and the spinning off of Allegis's
non-airline businesses. Although Wall Street frowned upon
this strategy, other firms have not. In particular, SAS is
pursuing services that integrate the handling of baggage,
reservations, ground transportation and boarding cards. It

recently acquired a 40 percent interest in the Intercontinental Hotel chain. SAS is also consistently the top
ranked airline in terms of customer satisfaction.
The effect of IT on the form and mode of resource
integration between markets is more difficult to generalize
and predict than that within a market. The great variety
of possible resources makes between-market forms of
structural change much more context-specific than those
within a market. This is particularly true of increase in

IT can also lead to vertical integration of resources. What
is required for this to happen is a decrease in production
economies of scale relative to transaction costs. An
excellent example of this is desktop publishing and other
graphics services that are increasingly being brought in-

house.
5.

CONCLUSIONS AND MANAGERIAL
IMPLICATIONS

value from integrating dissimilar resources.
Changes in industry structure are usually very complex. It
43 Vertical Integration of Resources

is difficult to classify these changes at a level high enough
to allow reasonable generalizations, yet detailed enough to
permit explanatory or predictive analyses. We think the
discussion above fits these criteria.

Vertical resource integration refers to the transfer of goods
and services along a single value chain. Vertical integration is driven by the balancing of production economies
and transaction costs, as in the horizontal case. But in the
vertical situation, decreased transaction costs or increased

The basic message is that, in many cases, resource posi-

production economies leads more to resource dis-

profitability than being leading edge in IT. Where a firm
is at a resource disadvantage with respect to information
systems, it should look very carefully at development
projects to see whether outsourcing or cooperative development and operation may be more appropriate. This will

tions may be more relevant to long-term survival and

i,itegration.

Malone, Yates and Benjamin (1987) first pointed out that
if IT reduced transaction costs then IT should lead to more

market-mediated transactions, i.e., reduced vertical
integration. They also pointed out that where there is

usually be the case where

some benefit to close vertical coordination, there is likely
to be an electronically implemented sole supplier relationship, which they call an "electronic hierarchy." Our work
here is consistent with their views.

•

the system is, or is likely to become, a commodity
service (i.e., a strategic necessity);

•

the system is subject to considerable scale econo-

mies in development or operation;

As we discussed above, IT can lead to vertical disintegration (outsourcing) in access to strategic resources

•

when a firm is at a scale disadvantage in operating those
resources (compared to larger competitors or other
vendors) and it is prohibitive to acquire the resources

there is a low transaction cost in acquiring the
service.

necessary to be competitive.

In particular, when a vendor exists that is not a direct
competitor, now or potentially in the future, and the

Where IT is the resource, or where IT is the mechanism

application is not critical to a core business, outsourcing is

for delivering the services of the resource, the mode of the

more likely than cooperative agreements.
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When a firm is at a disadvantage in terms of tangible
resources, systems may still play a crucial role in addressing this disadvantage. Systems can be used to mitigate a
resource disadvantage by coordinating resources with other
business units within the firm or with other companies with
needed resources. For example, the cooperative agreement
between SAS and Texas Air provides each with needed
feeder routes.
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Clemons, E. K., and Row, M. C.

"Cash Management
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competitors continue to exploit potential economies in
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resource integration, particularly between industries, a
much more holistic approach towards planning and strategy
may be required.
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A key implication of this discussion is that it may become
increasingly difficult to ignore inter-relationships between

markets and between business units within firms.
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However, we think that this
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Clearly we have not rigorously established the external
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ENDNOTES

1.

Of course, there are various feedback loops. For
example, firms can invest to increase entry barriers, so
conduct can influence structure. These complications
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are not relevant to the present discussion.
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It is for this reason that we use the term economic
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Rubin, P. H.
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A classic critique of the assumptions of traditional IO

is by Nelson and Winter (1982). We will return to
their proposed solution below, when we discuss the
new institutional economics.
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Company, 1980.

4.

This term was first used by Wernerfelt (1984), but the
theoretical roots of this view stretch back to Penrose

(1959), who first suggested that firms should be viewed
as a collection of resources.

Stoddard, D. "Otisline." HBS Publishing Division, Case
Number 9-186-304, April 1987.

5.

Contrast this with the traditional micro-economic
assumptions of optimizing agents with perfect information in a single period equilibrium.

Teece, D. J. "Economies of Scope and the Scope of the
Enterprise ' Journal of Economic Behavior and OrganizaNon, Volume 1, 1980, pp. 223-247.

6.

Grossman and Hart (1986) explicitly include profitabil-

ity in their formal model of vertical and lateral
Teece, D. "Firm Boundaries, Technological Innovation,
and Strategic Management." In L. G. Thomas, Editor, 77:e
Economics of Strategic Planning, 1986, pp. 181-199.
Teece, D. J.

integration. However, their work is specialized and
does not attempt to be a generalized extension of
transaction cost economics to handle firm profitability.

"Profiting from Technological Innovation:

7.

Implications for Integration, Collaboration, Licensing, and
Public Policy." In D. Teece, Editor, 77,e Conipetitive
Cha#enge, Cambridge: Ballinger Publishing Co., 1987,

This view is evolutionary in the sense of Nelson and
Winter (1982): current actions depend on the history
of the process to date, which is completely represented
as the stock of resources possessed.

pp. 185-219.
Teece, D. J.

8.

Market share is not a resource, per se. However, we
use the term to denote the customer relationships,
market presence, and physical facilities necessary to
obtain and maintain that share.

9.

A resource is specialized in the sense of Williamson

"Towards an Economic Theory of the

Multiproduct Firm." Journal of Economic Behavior and
O,ganization, Volume 3, 1982, pp. 39-63.

Thorelli, H. B. "Networks: Between Markets and Hierarchies." Strategic Management Journal, (UK), Volume 7,
Number 1, January/February 1986, pp. 37-51.

(1975) when it involves significant non-reversible
investment. Transaction costs are high because of the
risk and difficulty the party making the sunk investment assumes and must insure against for successful
contracting. In such cases, it may be more efficient to
acquire a more general resource and specialize it
internally.

Vitale, M. R. "The Growing Risks of Information Systems
Success." MIS Qwaiter&, December 1986, pp. 327-334.

Wernerfelt, B. "A Resource Based View of the Firm."
Strategic Management Jounial, Volume 5, 1984, pp. 171-

180.

10. This assumes market size is constant.
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11. This example is based on unpublished studies conducted in 1987 and 1988.

13. Of course, there are other pressures for consolidation.

14. That is, they are not competing in the same markets.

12. For example, MAC in Philadelphia, NYCE and
Citibank in New York, Baybanks and Yankee 24 in
Boston.
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15. Experience indicates that, in regions where competing

ATM networks exist, it is extremely rare for a bank
ever to switch networks.

